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INTRODUCTION
Thank you for inviting me to testify on the legality of extraordinary rendition, the practice by
which the United States transfers persons to third countries where they are more likely than not
to be subjected to harsh interrogation practices, including torture, in the hope of thereby gaining
"actionable intelligence." As one U.S. official involved in the practice infamously described it,
"We don't kick the [expletive] out of them. We send them to other countries so they can kick the
[expletive] out of them."1 This practice, which facilitates and condones the universally
condemned practice of torture, is illegal under both domestic and international law. While the
practice has been reported in the press, it has not yet been subject to a credible independent
investigation by the United States. If the United States is to begin to recover its standing as a
human rights standardbearer, Congress must make clear that extraordinary renditions are
impermissible, and must authorize an independent investigation of the administration's rendition
practice.
I am a professor of constitutional law, immigration law, and national security and civil liberties
at Georgetown University Law Center. I have written widely on the legal issues raised by the
tactics employed in the "war on terror," including three books and several law review articles.2 I
am also a volunteer cooperating attorney for the Center for Constitutional Rights, a legal and
educational non-profit organization in New York, and in that capacity I am co-counsel for Maher
Arar, whose wrenching story you have heard today. Arar's account demonstrates, more clearly
than any legal discussion, why rendition is morally, ethically, and legally wrong.
Arar's story also demonstrates how a democracy should respond when such a wrong has been
done. Canada undertook an extensive high-level official investigation of Arar's treatment, and
Canada's complicity in it. It issued a lengthy report fully exonerating Mr. Arar and harshly
criticizing Canadian authorities. And it paid Arar a substantial damages award for its complicity

in the wrongs that the United States and Syria inflicted on him. By contrast, the United States
argues that Arar's claims cannot even be heard in court, claiming that its interest in secrecy
trumps even the prohibition on torture.
I will address the domestic and international laws that prohibit rendition. It should not be
surprising that this practice is illegal under multiple sources of law. Few practices in the world
today are as universally condemned as torture. It is prohibited by our Constitution, by federal
statutes, by multiple international treaties, and by customary international law. Indeed, the
prohibition against torture is considered so fundamental to the world legal order that it is one of
the few norms classified as jus cogens, meaning that the world considers it absolute, admitting of
no exceptions. Other jus cogens norms include the prohibitions on slavery, genocide, and
extrajudicial executions. To ask whether it is permissible to transfer a person to a third country to
be tortured is akin to asking whether it is legally permissible to transfer a person to be sold into
slavery, to be summarily executed, or to be a victim of genocide. For all practical purposes, the
question answers itself.
As a matter of constitutional law, sending an individual to a third country for purposes of having
him subjected to torture "shocks the conscience," and accordingly violates substantive due
process, just as torturing the individual directly would violate due process. Where federal
officials are complicit in subjecting an individual to torture abroad, they also violate 18 U.S.C.
2340A, and can be held criminally liable. And when officials are complicit in subjecting an
individual to torture under color of foreign law, they can be held civilly liable under the Torture
Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. 1350, note. Finally, where, as in Mr. Arar's case, federal
officials use immigration powers to remove an individual to a country where he faces a threat of
torture, they have violated the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA),
which implements the Convention Against Torture, and prohibits removal to a country where
there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.
As a matter of international law, rendition to torture violates the Convention Against Torture,
which prohibits signatory nations, including the United States, not only from directly inflicting
torture, but also from sending individuals to other countries where they are more likely than not
to be tortured. Rendition to torture also violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Finally, rendition to torture violates customary international law, which as noted above,
recognizes the bar on torture as a jus cogens norm, the most absolute prohibition known to
international law.
U.S. officials often point to diplomatic assurances as a "defense" to claims that their
extraordinary renditions violate prohibitions on torture. But relying on such assurances, from
countries that have already shown themselves willing to violate solemn treaty obligations and jus

cogens norms, does not resolve the problem. Such countries' promises have already been shown
to be unreliable, and the kind of monitoring that would need to be done to ensure that such
promises are kept has never been done, and may be virtually impossible. The fact that
extraordinary rendition violates so many legal norms only underscores what should be selfevident. Just as it is patently illegal to torture a human being directly, so it is patently illegal to
deliver him to a third country to have it do the dirty work. Outsourcing torture does not make it
any less objectionable.
I. Federal Restrictions on Renditions to Torture
A. Due Process
Rendition to torture, like torture itself, violates due process. Had U.S. officials, instead of
sending Maher Arar to Syria, simply tortured him in an interrogation room at JFK Airport, they
would unquestionably have violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The fact that his rights were
violated through joint action taking place in two countries does not render U.S. officials' conduct
permissible for two reasons: (1) the constitutional violation arose in the U.S., and (2) the
Constitution bars U.S. officials from subjecting individuals to torture outside our borders,
particularly when the officials willfully transported Arar overseas to evade constitutional
restrictions.
Torture "shocks the conscience" and thereby violates substantive due process rights. Indeed, the
case establishing the "shocks the conscience" standard, Rochin v. California,3 found that
stomach pumping for drugs in a hospital violated due process precisely because it was "too close
to the rack and screw." Any physical coercion -- or even the threat of physical coercion -violates substantive due process rights. The fact that victims of rendition tend to be foreign
nationals, not U.S. citizens, does not deprive them of substantive due process protection against
conscience-shocking treatment. In Maher Arar's case, the constitutional violations arose while he
was detained in the United States, so the case for applying constitutional protections is especially
strong. But even where foreign nationals are abducted and rendered from countries outside the
United States, and do not step foot in the United States, substantive due process may bar U.S.
officials from delivering a person in federal custody to foreign officials for the purpose of
inflicting torture. While the Supreme Court has sometimes declined to extend constitutional
protections to foreign nationals outside our borders, in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), the
Court more recently stated that constitutional rights extend at least to some foreign nationals
outside U.S. The Rasul case principally addressed jurisdictional issues, but the Court squarely
stated that:
Petitioners' allegations -- that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of
terrorism against the United States, they have been held in Executive detention for more than two

years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States,
without access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing -- unquestionably
describe 'custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.' 28
U.S.C. 2241(c)(3). Cf. U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-278 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring), and cases cited therein.
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the decision relied on by the Rasul Court, Justice Kennedy, who cast the
deciding vote, concluded that fundamental constitutional rights extend to foreign nationals
overseas when application of the right would not be "impracticable and anomalous." 7 He found
that applying the Fourth Amendment in foreign countries would be impracticable, as there is no
authority for federal courts to issue warrants with respect to foreign countries, and expectations
of privacy may differ greatly from country to country. By contrast, there is nothing impracticable
or anomalous about holding U.S. officials to the due process prohibition on torture when they
conspire with others to subject an individual to such treatment. The prohibition on torture is
universal (unlike the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement at issue in Verdugo-Urquidez).
The concern that federal officials must be able to operate abroad in a legal and political
framework very different from that of the U.S. as in Verdugo-Urquidez does not arise with
respect to torture, because the prohibition of torture is universal.
B. 18 U.S.C. 2340A
Rendering an individual to a third country to subject him to torture also violates 18 U.S.C.
2340A, which makes it a felony to subject an individual to torture outside the United States, or to
conspire to do so. The reason Congress limited the criminal statute to torture inflicted outside the
United States was that torture inflicted within the United States was already a crime under both
federal and state assault, battery, and murder laws. Where federal officials send an individual to a
country where he faces a risk of torture for the purpose of eliciting information, they have
conspired to pursue an unlawful objective - torture abroad - and have committed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy - the rendition itself. As the Congressional Research Service
concluded, "Clearly, it would violate U.S. criminal law and [Convention Against Torture]
obligations for a U.S. official to conspire to commit torture via rendition, regardless of where
such renditions would occur."
Where federal officials do not intend to subject an individual to torture, criminal conspiracy
liability will not lie. Officials are likely to maintain that by obtaining diplomatic assurances that
an individual will not be tortured in the country to which he is transferred, they cannot be held
liable for conspiracy to subject the individual to torture. However, the existence of assurances is
not a bar to all prosecution; where circumstances demonstrate that the assurances were obtained
as a form of cover, and that in fact the purpose of transferring the individual was to subject him
to torture in the receiving country, the mere obtaining of diplomatic assurances would not be a

barrier to liability. (Diplomatic assurances are discussed in further detail below.)
C. Torture Victim Protection Act
Federal officials who are complicit in subjecting an individual to torture abroad may also be
civilly liable under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). That act states that an "[a]n
individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation (1)
subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that
individual[.]"12 Where federal officials act in concert with foreign officials to subject an
individual to torture under color of a foreign nation's law, they violate the TVPA.
The TVPA authorizes claims for "secondary liability" against individuals who aid or abet, or
conspire with, primary violators. But are federal officials who deliver an individual to another
country in order to have him tortured acting "under color of law of any foreign nation?" The
short answer is yes. Congress directed that the TVPA's "color of law" requirement should be
governed by jurisprudence interpreting the same term under 42 U.S.C. 1983.14 Under that
jurisprudence, a federal official's participation in joint activity with a state actor is sufficient for
1983 liability to attach. In other words, where federal and state officials act jointly to deprive an
individual of his civil rights, the federal official can be held liable for his complicity in denying
an individual's civil rights under color of state law. By analogy, then, a federal official who
participates in a joint enterprise with foreign officials to have an individual subjected to torture
under color of foreign law is liable under the TVPA.
The district court in Arar's case disagreed with this analysis, concluding that federal officials
could be held liable under the TVPA only if they acted at the direction of the Syrian officials;
otherwise, it reasoned, the federal officials were acting under federal law, not foreign law.15 But
in a joint enterprise, it is surely possible for federal officials to act under color of both
jurisdictions' laws, and therefore to be liable for their part in subjecting an individual to torture
under color of a foreign country's law. Had private parties abducted Arar and transported him to
Syria to be tortured by Syrian authorities, they would unquestionably be liable under the TVPA.
There is no reason why abuses by U.S. officials should be exempt from liability under the TVPA
when the same abuses by private parties are actionable.
Construing the TVPA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that a "private
individual acts under color of law within the meaning of 1983 when he acts "together with state
officials or with significant state aid."16 Accordingly, where a federal official acts together with
foreign officials or with significant aid from the foreign government to subject an individual to
torture under color of foreign law, he is liable in damages under the TVPA.
D. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act

The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA) was enacted to implement
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. It provides that It shall be the policy of the United
States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a
country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of
being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United
States.
FARRA also directed executive agencies to adopt regulations to implement Article 3 of the
Torture Convention, barring countries from sending individuals to countries where they face a
risk of torture. The DHS, the Department of Justice, and the State Department have adopted such
regulations. Those regulations absolutely prohibit the removal of all persons to countries where
they would more likely than not be tortured.18 Thus, where federal officials exploit immigration
authority to transfer an individual to another country to be tortured, they violate FARRA and its
implementing regulations. FARRA, however, creates neither a private right of action for
damages nor criminal liability.
II. International Law Restrictions on Renditions to Torture
A. Convention Against Torture
The U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT), a treaty ratified by the United States in 1994, prohibits all forms of torture,
and also prohibits the transfer of persons to countries where there is a substantial likelihood that
they will be tortured. Article 3 provides that no state "shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite
a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture." While Article 3 is explicitly engaged by the decision to
remove Maher Arar from the United States to Syria, some have raised questions about whether
Article 3 applies where a country transfers an individual from another country to a third country.
The Congressional Research Service has opined that the terms "expel, return, or extradite" in
Article 3 of CAT may not cover a rendition from another country to a third country. When CIA
officials render an individual from Afghanistan to Egypt, for example, the CRS reasons, the
transfer may not amount as a formal matter to an expulsion, a return, or an extradition.19 This
interpretation is predicated on a narrow reading of "expel" to mean an expulsion only from the
acting state's own borders.
However, expulsion could also be read more broadly, to include any forcible transfer of an
individual out of the country in which he is residing, regardless of which state is involved in the
transfer. Given the absolute nature of the ban on torture, and the sweeping ban on all forms of
otherwise legal transfers to countries where there is a substantial likelihood of torture, such a

reading of expulsion is more consistent with the purpose of the Convention. Indeed, it is
inconceivable that the framers of the Convention meant to carve out a loophole affirmatively
permitting informal transfers to torture while prohibiting all formal transfers; it is far more likely
that they intended their language to be all-encompassing. Thus, to interpret the CAT prohibition
not to apply to informal transfers would violate the intent of the treaty. The United States appears
to have accepted the broader understanding of the Convention. In FARRA, it stated that it is
against United States policy to "expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return" of a
person to a country where he faces a danger of torture, "regardless of whether the person is
physically present in the United States."
This broader understanding of the Torture Convention language is also supported by the fact that
the drafters added the reference to "extradition" to the original draft of Article 3 to ensure that it
would "cover all manners by which a person is physically transferred to another state." Finally,
this broader interpretation is buttressed by the fact that even where human rights treaties do not
expressly bar transfers to torture, but merely bar torture itself, they have been interpreted to
prohibit all transfers to countries where individuals face a risk of torture. Thus, the European
Convention on Human Rights prohibits torture, but contains no language barring the removal or
transfer of individuals to other countries where they might be tortured. Nonetheless, the
European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the Convention's prohibition on torture implies a
prohibition on any kind of transfer or forcible removal of an individual to a country where there
are substantial grounds to believe that he will be tortured. If a human rights treaty that prohibits
torture but is silent on forcible transfers nonetheless prohibits all forcible transfers to countries
posing a risk of torture, surely a Convention that expressly prohibits both torture and forcible
transfers should be interpreted just as broadly.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the United States
ratified in 1992, prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Like the
European Convention on Human Rights, it does not expressly prohibit forcible transfers, but the
Human Rights Committee charged with interpreting the ICCPR has interpreted its prohibition on
torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment to include an obligation on states not to
"expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, expulsion, or
refoulement." Thus, transferring an individual to a country where he faces a risk that he will be
tortured violates the ICCPR. The ICCPR is not self-executing, and therefore does not give rise to
a private cause of action, but it is nonetheless binding on the United States as a matter of
international law.
III. Diplomatic Assurances

Government officials have asserted that the United States obtained assurances from Syria that it
would not torture Mr. Arar, and that this demonstrates that his removal was not for the purpose
of having him tortured. Other officials have claimed that such assurances have generally been
obtained where there was a concern about the possibility of torture. Diplomatic assurances from
countries with a demonstrated record of torture are insufficient to reduce the risk of torture, for
two reasons - we have no reason to trust a country that repeatedly tortures, and second, we have
no effective way of monitoring such assurances.
First, diplomatic assurances are obtained only where absent such assurances, there is a likelihood
of torture. If there is no risk of torture, there would be no need for diplomatic assurances. The
United States has thus never sought diplomatic assurances from Canada or the United Kingdom,
for example. It seeks assurances only from countries where there is reason to believe that torture
is practiced sufficiently frequently to bar transfer absent the assurances.
If the countries we seek assurances from routinely engage in torture in direct violation of their
own explicit treaty promises, what justification is there for believing that they will honor a much
less formal bilateral side agreement? In Filartiga v. Pena- Irala,24 the brief filed by the United
States explained that countries that engage in torture never admit that they do so.25 Therefore, a
country that routinely and repeatedly engages in torture will also routinely and repeatedly lie
about that fact. If officials lie about the fact that they engage in torture when confronted about it,
why is there any reason to believe they will not lie about the diplomatic assurances they give?
There are particular reasons not to trust diplomatic assurances from Syria. We generally don't
believe anything that the Syrian government tells us, whether about its interference in Lebanon,
its attempt to develop nuclear weapons, or its role in Iraq. Indeed, it seems that about the only
matter on which the United States has purported to trust Syria in years was its reported assurance
not to torture Mr. Arar. Of course, had U.S. officials truly wanted to avoid the prospect of Mr.
Arar being tortured, they had a much simpler and infinitely more reliable route - to deport him to
Canada, where he had resided as a citizen for nearly two decades, and which, unlike Syria, has
no record of torturing its suspects.
Second, for assurances to be truly reliable, particularly where the receiving state has a record of
torture, substantial monitoring would be necessary. Absent extremely intrusive and costly
monitoring, it is highly unlikely that any state can be held to its promises - particularly as states
that engage in torture routinely lie about whether they do so. Torture is particularly challenging
to monitor. Behind closed doors, it is difficult to know what happens in an interrogation room or
prison cell. And states have learned to inflict torture in ways that do not leave physical marks. As
far as we know, the United States made absolutely no attempt to monitor Mr. Arar's treatment by
the Syrians, or indeed to monitor the treatment of any person whom it rendered.

The Commissioner for Human Rights for the Council of Europe, Alvaro Gil- Robles, has made
precisely such arguments, stating that: The weakness inherent in the practice of diplomatic
assurances lies in the fact that where there is a need for such assurances, there is clearly an
acknowledged risk of torture or ill-treatment. Due to the absolute nature of the prohibition on
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, formal assurances cannot suffice where a risk
nevertheless remains ... When assessing the reliability of diplomatic assurances, an essential
criteria must be that the receiving state does not practice or condone torture or ill-treatment, and
that it exercises effective control over the acts of nonstate agents. In all other circumstances it is
highly questionable whether assurances can be regarded as providing indisputable safeguards
against torture and illtreatment.
Mr. Gil-Robles' comments were inspired by the Swedish government's expulsion of two
Egyptian asylum-seekers in December 2001 on the strength of diplomatic assurances obtained
from the Egyptian authorities. Once in Egypt, the men were detained incommunicado and
reportedly tortured. In reviewing this case, the Committee Against Torture rejected the use of
diplomatic assurances to guard against such a strong risk of torture, and noted that because of the
assurances, the Swedish official in Egypt responsible for monitoring the treatment of the two
Egyptians concealed evidence that they had been tortured. For these reasons, the Special
Rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights has said that "post-return monitoring
mechanisms do little to mitigate the risk of torture and have been proven ineffective in both
safeguarding against torture and as a mechanism of accountability."
In short, because diplomatic assurances rely on trust in circumstances that provide no reason for
trust, and because absent 24/7 monitoring the promises cannot be enforced, diplomatic
assurances should be looked on with great skepticism. Where, as in Mr. Arar's case, there was a
much simpler avenue available were officials truly interested in avoiding the risk of torture, they
appear to be little more than window-dressing.
CONCLUSION
Rendition to torture is wrong as a moral matter, illegal as an international and federal legal
matter, and likely counterproductive as a security matter. Our pursuit of this tactic has
occasioned widespread criticism of the United States around the world, playing into our enemies'
hands by giving them ideal recruitment propaganda. It should be plain to see that just as torture
itself is wrong and illegal under all circumstances, so is transferring a human being to another
country to have it engage in the very same wrong and illegal behavior. Congress should
immediately authorize a full-scale independent investigation of the administration's extraordinary
rendition policy.

